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INTRODUCTION 
The University Hospital and American Casualty have something in common. Both 
purported to shield Nurse Broka from having to pay for liabilities caused by his alleged 
professional negligence. The University Hospital offered this protection, in the form of a 
self-insurance trust, because Nurse Broka was its employee. American Casualty 
supposedly provided this protection to Nurse Broka because he purchased professional 
liability insurance and paid premiums to American Casualty. 
The University Hospital dutifully delivered this protection to Nurse Broka when it 
learned that Mrs. Hepworth intended to file a malpractice lawsuit alleging that her 
husband died due to Nurse Broka's negligence while treating Mr. Hepworth. It settled 
Mrs. Hepworth's claim and obtained a release that covered Nurse Broka. The settlement 
spared everyone involved, including Mrs. Hepworth and Nurse Broka, the emotional 
trauma that would have ensued from a trial. 
American Casualty, however, utterly failed to deliver on its promise to provide 
professional liability coverage to Nurse Broka. The University Hospital stepped into 
Nurse Broka's shoes and notified American Casualty that Mrs. Hepworth was claiming 
her husband died due to Nurse Broka's negligence. It invited American Casualty to 
participate in the settlement negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth. American Casualty 
refused, essentially stating that Nurse Broka had been paying for an excess insurance 
policy with American Casualty. The University Hospital asked American Casualty to 
reimburse it for what it ultimately paid to settle Mrs. Hepworth's claim and obtain a 
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release exonerating Nurse Broka from further liability1; again, American Casualty 
refused. 
The University Hospital asserted Nurse Broka's right to malpractice insurance 
coverage when it invited American Casualty to engage in settlement negotiations with 
Mrs. Hepworth, and when it subsequently filed its subrogation lawsuit against American 
Casualty. American Casualty has denied Nurse Broka's right to coverage for various and 
changing reasons, breaking its fundamental pledge to provide professional liability 
coverage to its insured.2 This Court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment in 
*The release did not specifically name Troy Broka. However, it specifically 
covered employees of the University Hospital, and American Casualty concedes that 
Nurse Broka was "a beneficiary of the University's settlement...." (R. 164.) 
2Before the University Hospital filed its subrogation lawsuit, American Casualty 
told the University Hospital that Nurse Broka was not entitled to coverage because the 
University Hospital's self-insurance program was Nurse Broka's primary coverage, and 
the American Casualty policy was excess. Once the University Hospital filed its lawsuit, 
American Casualty abandoned that argument, much like it abandoned its insured, and 
maintained that since Mrs. Hepworth had supposedly not made a "claim" against Nurse 
Broka as defined in the American Casualty policy, Nurse Broka was not entitled to 
coverage and the University Hospital was therefore not entitled to be reimbursed by 
American Casualty. The Honorable Judge Glenn Iwasaki agreed with American 
Casualty's argument to the court, concluding that the lack of a "claim" was "critical as 
the[sic] American Casualty's policy is triggered only by a 'claim' or an insured's legal 
obligation to pay some amount." (R. 503.) Now, on appeal, American Casualty abandons 
its argument that there was no coverage because there was no claim. American Casualty 
actually belittles its own former argument, calling it a "red herring" and contending that 
"the existence of a 'claim' is not the proper focus of this litigation." (Brief of Appellee, 
pp. 26-29.) Its changing arguments underscore the weakness of its position that it does 
not owe Nurse Broka coverage and therefore should not have to pay the University 
Hospital for settling Mrs. Hepworth's claim against Nurse Broka. 
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American Casualty's favor because the University must be reimbursed for handling the 
obligation American Casualty has tried to dodge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UNIVERSITY CAN RECOVER AGAINST AMERICAN 
CASUALTY BECAUSE THE "LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO 
PAY" PREREQUISITE TO COVERAGE WAS TRIGGERED. 
The "Coverage Agreement" in the insurance policy American Casualty issued to 
Nurse Broka states that American Casualty will pay all amounts "which you become 
legally obligated to pay as a result of injury or damage caused by a medical incident by 
you . . . ." (R. 273.) American Casualty argued to the trial court that Nurse Broka never 
became "legally obligated to pay" Mrs. Hepworth's claim because he was immune from 
suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. (R. 170.) On appeal, American 
Casualty raises an entirely new interpretation of this policy language. American Casually 
now contends that if one reads this phrase in conjunction with another phrase appearing 
three pages earlier in the policy, in a different section of the policy, "it is clear that the 
only reasonable interpretation of that phrase" is that Nurse Broka is not legally obligated 
to pay unless there were a judgment against Nurse Broka or a settlement to which 
American Casualty agreed. (Brief of Appellee, p. 18.) 
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A. American Casualty's New Reading of "Legally Obligated to 
Pay" is not Plausible. 
There are several problems with American Casualty's new construction of its 
phrase. First, it is a principle of insurance contract interpretation that a phrase must be 
clearly understood standing by itself If an urged reading of a phrase can only be 
achieved by piecing it together with phrases in other parts of the policy, this Court should 
reject that reading and look to the phrase alone for its meaning. American Casualty's self-
serving definition of "legally obligated to pay" not only requires patching different parts 
of its policy together as if they were next to each other in the first place, it calls for 
narrowing the words in the phrase in derogation of their common meaning. 
The second problem with American Casualty's current interpretation of "legally 
obligated to pay" is that it is painfully strained. American Casualty effectively claims that 
a phrase found in the Coverage Agreement section of its policy cannot be understood 
until one flips back a few pages in the policy to the section dealing with the preconditions 
to an insured filing suit against American Casualty. 
Finally, American Casualty's argument that its obligation to indemnify Nurse 
Broka could only arise if there were a judgment against him or a settlement with 
American Casualty's consent is that it ignores two crucial facts - there was never a 
judgment thanks to the University Hospital's appropriate settlement of a tragic case; and 
there was no agreement among American Casualty, Nurse Broka and Mrs. Hepworth 
because American Casualty refused to participate in settlement negotiations. There is a 
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strong public policy in Utah favoring settlements of legal disputes. "[Settlements are 
favored in the law, and should be encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing 
not only to the parties, but also to the judicial system." Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205 
(Utah 1998) (quoting Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 
(Utah 1979)); see also Wanzek Constr., Inc. v. Employers Ins. ofWausau, 667 N.W.2d 
473, 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (construing policy language to require a lawsuit as 
precondition to coverage would thwart public policy goal of encouraging resolution of 
disputes without litigation). If this Court were to determine that Nurse Hepworth did not 
become "legally obligated to pay" because the University Hospital reasonably settled Mrs. 
Hepworth's claim rather than forcing protracted litigation and an emotionally wrenching 
trial and judgment, it would derogate that public policy. Likewise, the only reason Mrs. 
Hepworth's claim settled without agreement among Nurse Broka, American Casualty and 
Mrs. Hepworth is that American Casualty flatly refused to engage in settlement 
discussions. It was content to let the University Hospital single-handedly broker a quick 
and reasonable resolution. If this Court determined that Nurse Broka was never "legally 
obligated to pay" because American Casualty did not agree to the settlement amount, 
American Casualty would profit from its own efforts to ensure that coverage was not 
triggered. See Med. Protective Co. v. Bell 716 F. Supp. 392, 405 (W.D. Mo. 1989), rev'd 
on other grounds, 912 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating an insurer who refuses to 
participate in settlement negotiations "cannot now be heard to avoid contribution to the 
settlement on the grounds that he did not participate in negotiating it"). 
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American Casualty's resort to caselaw mentioning "legally obligated to pay" in an 
indemnification context is not helpful. When reading an insurance policy, one should be 
able to rely on the policy itself rather than resorting to court decisions to divine its 
meaning. Moreover, American Casualty's policy contains two sections that define terms 
in the policy. One is located in the "General Policy Conditions" section of the policy, and 
one is located in the "Nurses Professional Liability Coverage Part" section, the same 
section where the term "legally obligated to pay" is found. (R. 270-71, 275-76.) If 
American Casualty wanted to make clear what "legally obligated to pay" meant, it easily 
could have included a definition in the policy. Considering that American Casualty has 
put forth two different definitions of the phrase and the University Hospital has offered 
yet another, it should have explained what the phrase meant in the policy itself. 
B. The Trial Court Should Have Accepted the University Hospital's 
Definition of "Legally Obligated to Pay". 
It is noteworthy that American Casualty declared to the trial court that "legally 
obligated to pay" meant "actual personal liability," and now it tells this Court the phrase 
means something quite different. By proposing two different readings of a policy phrase 
that it drafted, it has made the quintessential concession that the phrase is ambiguous.3 
3Contrary to American Casualty's offhand remark that the University Hospital 
raised the notion that this phrase is ambiguous for the first time on appeal (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 15), it is evident in the parties' briefing to the trial court that each party 
advocated a different reading of the phrase. Either reading is reasonable. American 
Casualty contended in its motion for summary judgment that "legally obligated to pay" 
instead should be viewed with Nurse Broka's immunity under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act in mind, so that Nurse Broka would never be "legally obligated to pay" 
because he enjoyed personal immunity under Utah statute while employed at the 
6 
The trial court should have rejected American Casualty's proposed reading of the phrase 
and accepted the University Hospital's interpretation because of this. Am. Cas. Co. of 
Reading v. Equal Star Ins. Co., 568 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1977) (noting if insurance policy 
is reasonably susceptible of different meanings, "any doubt should be resolved in favor of 
insurance coverage"). 
The University Hospital's interpretation of the phrase "legally obligated to pay" is 
a reasonable construction. Nurse Broka became legally obligated to pay when Mrs. 
Hepworth communicated that she felt Nurse Broka's negligence caused her husband's 
death. At that point, it was incumbent upon American Casualty to step in and participate 
in settlement negotiations on its insured's behalf. Since it failed to do so, and since the 
University Hospital paid the settlement, the University Hospital must be reimbursed by 
American Casualty through subrogation. 
The University Hospital's reasonable interpretation of "legally obligated to pay" 
not only complies with Utah case law mandating that insurance policies be construed in 
favor of coverage, but it comports with a recent decision liberally interpreting similar 
language. In Estate ofBerkemeir v. Hartford Ins. Co., 2003 UT App 78, 67 P.3d 1012, 
this Court adopted a broad definition of the insurance policy clause "legally entitled to 
recover" in the context of determining an insured's right to underinsured motorists 
University Hospital. (R. 170.) The University Hospital responded that "legally obligated 
to pay" should be taken at its literal common law meaning, to require that if Nurse Broka 
negligently injures someone, he is legally obligated to pay. (R. 328; Brief of Appellants, 
p. 20.) 
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benefits. This Court noted that an insured is legally entitled to recover when "there is a 
viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law." Berkemeir, 2003 
UT App 78 at Tl 7 (quoting Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192, 195 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996)). Mrs. Hepworth felt Nurse Broka was responsible for her 
husband's death and intended to file a malpractice lawsuit. Had the University Hospital 
not judiciously settled her malpractice claim, she could have, and in all likelihood would 
have, named Nurse Broka as a defendant. Mrs. Hepworth had a viable malpractice claim 
against Nurse Broka that could have been reduced to a judgment had she been forced to 
file a lawsuit. By the same token, Nurse Broka was "legally obligated to pay" Mrs. 
Hepworth's claim because he would be legally obligated at common law to pay for his 
alleged negligence. 
In view of the Berkemeir case and Utah's public policy favoring settlements, the 
cases American Casualty cites to support its argument that Mrs. Hepworth needed to file a 
lawsuit naming Nurse Broka as a defendant before Nurse Broka became "legally 
obligated to pay" are not controlling. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 22-5.) Again, Mrs. 
Hepworth intended to file a malpractice lawsuit. She likely would have named Nurse 
Broka as a defendant since she thought he contributed to her husband's death. The fact 
that this did not happen thanks to the University Hospital settling her claim should not 
jeopardize the University Hospital's subrogation claim. 
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POINT II 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT 
BAR THE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL'S SUBROGATION CLAIM. 
American Casualty incorrectly asserts that the University Hospital cannot seek 
reimbursement of the money expended to settle Mrs. Hepworth's claim and obtain a 
release covering Nurse Broka because the Utah Governmental Immunity Act makes the 
University Hospital solely responsible. American Casualty cannot use this statute as a 
shield to protect it from honoring its contractual obligation to its insured, or to the 
University Hospital as it assumes Nurse Broka's rights in subrogation. 
A. The Governmental Immunity Act does not Prohibit a Self-
Insured Entity Like the University Hospital from Seeking 
Indemnification from an Employee's Private Insurer. 
The University Hospital has a self-insurance program that allows it to pay up to 
$1 million of its own funds to defend and indemnify employees for a claim arising from 
their negligence. Importantly, the program is meant to apply if other insurance is not 
available to defend and indemnify employees: 
The purpose of this Trust is to establish a mechanism through a Trust Fund 
arrangement for paying judgments and agreed settlements arising out of 
malpractice (or other uninsured liability claims (hereinafter "claims")) 
against the University on a self-insurance basis . . . . 
(R. 146) (emphasis added). Other insurance was available here, through the primary 
professional liability policy Nurse Broka purchased from American Casualty. 
American Casualty treats the Governmental Immunity Act ("the Act") as though 
the Utah Legislature passed it for the benefit of private insurers who sell liability 
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insurance to government employees. To the contrary, the Utah Legislature enacted it to 
protect government entities and their employees from certain liabilities, thereby 
preserving the financial resources of the State and its subdivisions. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 
UT 19, TJ 64 5 P.3d 616. The Act is not meant to allow employees' private insurers to 
stand by and let the employer's self-insurance program, ultimately paid for by Utah 
taxpayers, cover a loss for which the private insurer would otherwise be responsible. 
It is true, as American Casualty points out, that Section 63-30-38 of the Act states 
that a governmental entity cannot seek indemnification from the employee himself if it 
pays a judgment or settlement on the employee's behalf. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-38 
(1997). It is also true that had Mrs. Hepworth sued Nurse Broka, he would have been 
entitled to indemnification from the University Hospital. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-36 
(Supp. 2003). Nonetheless, these provisions simply do not proscribe the University 
Hospital's subrogation action. There is no provision in the Act stating that the 
employee's private insurer does not have to indemnify the governmental entity for monies 
paid to satisfy a judgment or settlement involving the insured employee. While the Utah 
Legislature was careful to excuse employees from indemnifying their employers, it 
notably did not draft a provision preventing the governmental employer from obtaining 
indemnification from the employee's private insurer. The Utah Legislature obviously felt 
it important to prevent insurers of governmental entities from seeking contribution from 
employees, but it did not deem it necessary to create a provision preventing governmental 
10 
entities from seeking contribution from employees' private insurers to recoup funds paid 
out of self-insured programs. 
None of the cases American Casualty relies on for the proposition that government 
entities supposedly cannot pursue subrogation from an employee's private insurer are 
applicable to this situation, where a self-insured entity funds a settlement from its own 
pocket (or to be more exact, the taxpayers' pockets). The cases of United 
Pacific/Reliance Insurance Co. v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 670 P.2d 172 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1983); St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 213 N.W.2d 619 
(Iowa 1975); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. American Mutual Insurance Co., 105 Cal. Rptr. 
295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); and Bridewell v. Board of Education, 276 N.E.2d 745 (111. App. 
Ct. 1971), are all cases brought by insurance companies for governmental entities seeking 
contribution from the employees' private insurers. There is no indication in any of these 
cases that the government body was self-insured and that, if it were, it could not obtain 
indemnification from the employee's private insurer. The Utah case American Casualty 
cites, Gulf Insurance Co. v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 567 P.2d 158 (Utah 1977), also 
involved the issue of whether a governmental entity's insurer could recover from an 
employee's private insurer, so it, too, is inapplicable. 
Moreover, for every case American Casualty references, there is another holding 
that a government entity's insurer is entitled to contribution from an employee's liability 
insurer. For example, in the recent case of Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Teachers 
Insurance Co., 746 N.E.2d 725 (111. 2001), an insurance company that provided private 
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insurance to teachers contended that it was not responsible to cover its insured teacher in 
a claim brought by a student injured while a passenger in the teacher's car. Pointing out 
that the school district also insured the teacher's vehicle and that the school district was 
statutorily required to indemnify the teacher, the private insurer argued that the school 
district's insurance company had to indemnify the teacher. The Illinois Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, noting that it would not violate the intent of the statute to give 
effect to both insurance policies and require contribution from both. "To construe [the 
school board's] policy as excess would not contravene the public policy that a school 
board has a duty to indemnify its employees for accidents that arise in the scope of 
employment," the court concluded. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 732. 
The Illinois Supreme Court is not the only court to determine that making a 
governmental entity's insurance excess to an employee's private insurance fully complies 
with statutory requirements that the entity indemnify the employee for liabilities. In 
Brandt v. Minnesota, 428 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), the court required a state 
employee's liability insurance carrier to pay a judgment rendered against the employee 
when he injured another employee in the course and scope of his employment. Minnesota 
statute required the state to indemnify employees for all liabilities incurred in connection 
with their employment. The statutes were strongly worded, mandating that "[i]t is the 
express intent of this provision to defend, save harmless, and indemnify any employee of 
the state against the full amount of any final judgment" and that the indemnification 
extended to judgments "actually and reasonably incurred." The court agreed with the 
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state's argument that the employee's private insurance "forecloses [the employee's] right 
to indemnification" from the state: 
If the legislature had sought to provide state employees with 
indemnification rights for losses covered by private insurance it could have 
easily drafted [the statute] to permit indemnification for judgments [actually 
causing personal loss to the employee]. Its failure to do so leads us to 
conclude that [the statute] was designed to allow indemnification for losses 
incurred in excess of the employee's private insurance. 
Brandt, 428 N.W.2d at 418. Likewise, Utah's Act does not expressly require a 
government entity to indemnify an employee when the employee has private insurance, 
nor does it prohibit an entity from seeking reimbursement from the private insurer. 
The court in Younker v. County of San Diego, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1324 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991) interpreted a California statute similar to Utah's Act and determined that the 
government entity could meet its obligation of indemnifying the employee by looking to 
the employee's liability insurer. The court required the liability insurer to reimburse the 
county for a judgment paid on its employee's behalf, observing that "[w]here, as here, a 
public employee is fully covered, there is no prescription against the public entity 
satisfying its statutory obligation [to indemnify the employee] by availing itself of 
insurance designating the employee as the named insured." Younker, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 
1331. By the same reasoning, nothing in Utah's Act prevents the University from looking 
to American Casualty, rather than its own coffers, to fulfill its statutory duty to indemnify 
Nurse Broka. See also Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Cas. Co., 184 Cal. App. 3d 
163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that statute calling for school district to indemnify 
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employee and to provide insurance to meet that obligation did not "specify how this 
obligation to so insure is to be met," so school district could comply with statute by 
turning to employee's own liability insurance); Firecrest Poultry Farms Co. v. State, 728 
P.2d 968 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (private insurance policy, not state liability fund, covered 
government employee's defense and indemnity; even though Oregon statute required state 
to indemnify employee, when private insurance was available, liability fund was not 
responsible to pay); Sun Indem. Co. v. Bd. ofEduc, 34 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1942) (noting that teacher's insurer could not be reimbursed by the school board, despite 
requirement that board indemnify its teachers; the beneficiary of indemnity from the 
governmental entity is the employee, not his private insurer). 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act does not exist to absolve liability insurance 
companies from covering their government employee insureds whenever they incur 
liability in the course and scope of their employment. It exists for the benefit of 
government employees and their employers, including Nurse Broka and the University 
Hospital. The Act requires the University to indemnify Nurse Broka, but it does not 
forbid it to do so by turning to his private insurer. Similarly, nothing in the Act prevents 
the University from pursuing subrogation against American Casualty. 
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POINT III 
AMERICAN CASUALTY'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING. 
A. American Casualty's Professional Liability Coverage is Illusory. 
American Casualty charged Nurse Broka premiums for what it called a 
"professional liability insurance policy/' marketed it as a policy that he needed even if 
his employer insured him for acts within the course and scope of his employment, then 
refused to provide insurance coverage for his alleged malpractice while working at the 
University Hospital. In response to the University Hospital's observation that the policy 
is illusory because American Casualty would never provide primary coverage to Nurse 
Broka while working at the University Hospital, American Casualty suggests three 
narrow circumstances in which a nurse insured under its policy could tender defense and 
indemnification and actually receive a positive response. All three instances, freelance 
home healthcare assistance; provision of nursing care to family members; or good 
Samaritan assistance, are circumstances in which the University Hospital would not 
provide coverage to a nurse from its self-insurance fund, because they are by their very 
nature acts that do not involve their employment at a hospital. Additionally, it is hard to 
believe American Casualty would provide primary coverage under the first scenario. Any 
negligence occurring in the first scenario could be covered by the patient's homeowner's 
insurance, and American Casualty has shown its eagerness in this litigation to claim 
Nurse Broka's policy was excess to any other insurance. (R. 354-58.) Nurse Broka 
would likely never call upon American Casualty to provide coverage in the third scenario, 
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since most states, including Utah, have good Samaritan statutes that immunize individuals 
rendering emergency care from liability. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-22 (Supp. 2003) ("A 
person who renders emergency care . . . during an emergency, gratuitously and in good 
faith, is not liable for any civil damages or penalties as a result of any act or 
omission. . . .") 
American Casualty's failure to come up with a viable scenario under which it 
would actually provide primary coverage to Nurse Broka while working at the University 
Hospital underscores how illusory the policy is. American Casualty sold a worthless 
professional liability insurance policy to Nurse Broka, if all of its various and changing 
arguments against reimbursing the University Hospital for obtaining a release covering 
Nurse Broka are to be believed. Under the doctrine of illusory coverage, American 
Casualty should pay for losses that would be reasonably covered under a primary 
professional liability policy. 
B. American Casualty has Waived its Coverage Defenses. 
American Casualty contends its July 17, 1997 letter to the University Hospital 
explaining why it would not participate in settlement negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth 
was broad enough to communicate a virtually blanket denial of coverage, to include any 
additional reasons for denial American Casualty might come up with long after the 
University Hospital settled with Mrs. Hepworth. A review of the letter reveals that 
American Casualty clearly limited its reason for declining to participate in settlement 
negotiations. (R. 291-92.) It was therefore bound to deny coverage on that reason alone. 
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American Casualty stated in its letter that the terms of Nurse Broka's policy make 
it "an excess carrier at best." (R. 291.) It then cited verbatim the "Other Insurance" 
clause of the policy, providing that "this insurance is excess over any other insurance, 
self-insurance, self-insured retention or similar programs, whether primary, excess, 
contingent or on any other basis." (R. 291.) American Casualty further commented that 
"[i]n addition to the language cited above, Mr. Broka is an employee of the University of 
Utah Health Sciences Center and as such should be defended under their policy." (R. 
292.) 
The Utah Administrative Regulations governing insurance companies preclude 
insurers from denying a claim on the ground of a specific policy term unless the insurer 
references that term in its denial letter. Utah Admin. Code R 590-190-10(2) (2003). The 
only policy provision American Casualty mentioned in its denial was the "other 
insurance" clause,4 and that is the only policy provision it could rely upon in this lawsuit 
for refusing to reimburse the University Hospital for monies paid to settle Mrs. 
Hepworth's claim. American Casualty waived any right to argue to the trial court, and to 
this Court, that the University Hospital cannot seek subrogation because Nurse Broka is 
supposedly not "legally obligated to pay." 
4American Casualty points to the Affidavit of Lynda Faldmo as some sort of 
admission that the University Hospital construed the July 17, 1997 letter to be a denial of 
coverage for the various reasons it would later assert for the first time in this litigation. 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 41.) Her statement in the Affidavit that American Casualty "refused 
to participate or provide coverage" merely refers to American Casualty's refusal to 
provide coverage on the sole basis American Casualty listed in its letter. American 
Casualty is trying to read words into an affidavit that are not there. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the district court's grant of summai \ judgment to 
American Casualty and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment to the 
University Hospital. American Casualh is Nuisr Hioka's priinar> insurance carrier as a 
matter of law, and it should reimburse the University Hospital for settling Mrs. 
1 Irpv ' ,Hlli s H;iim. 
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